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Abstract
A Multi-linked negotiation problem occurs when an agent needs to negotiate with multiple other agents about different subjects (tasks,
conﬂicts, or resource requirements), and the negotiation over one subject has inﬂuence on negotiations over other subjects. The solution
of the multi-linked negotiations problem will become increasingly important for the next generation of advanced multi-agent systems.
However, most current negotiation research looks only at a single negotiation and thus does not present techniques to manage and reason
about multi-linked negotiations. In this paper, we ﬁrst present a technique based on the use of a partial-order schedule and a measure of
the schedule, called ﬂexibility, which enables an agent to reason explicitly about the interactions among multiple negotiations. Next, we
introduce a formalized model of the multi-linked negotiation problem. Based on this model, a heuristic search algorithm is developed
for ﬁnding a near-optimal ordering of negotiation issues and their parameters. Using this algorithm, an agent can evaluate and compare
different negotiation approaches and choose the best one. We show how an agent uses this technology to effectively manage interacting
negotiation issues. Experimental work is presented which shows the efﬁciency of this approach.
keywords: multiple related negotiations, agent reasoning and control, conﬂict resolution, performance optimization
1 Introduction
Multi-linked negotiation describes a situation where one agent needs to negotiate with multiple agents about different issues (tasks,
conﬂicts, or resource requirements), and the negotiation over one issue affects the negotiations over other issues. In a multi-task,
resource-sharing environment, an agent needs to deal with multiple, related negotiation issues including: tasks contracted to other
agents, tasks requested by other agents, external resource requirements for local activities, and interrelationships among activities
distributed among different agents.
Consider the following example shown in Figure 1, which is a simpliﬁed supply chain containing four agents. The Consumer
Agent represents the environment that generates tasks to be completed by the other three agents. When a new task is generated
by the Consumer Agent, it indicates how much it is worth and its deadline. When the Computer Producer Agent receives task
Purchase Computer from the Consumer Agent, it also needs to sub-contract parts of the task Get Hardware and Deliver Computer
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Figure 1: A supply chain scenario
to the Hardware Producer Agent and the Transporter Agent respectively. The following three negotiations are interrelated: the
negotiation between the Computer Producer Agent and the Consumer Agent on task Purchase Computer, the negotiation between
the Computer Producer Agent and the Hardware Producer Agent on task Get Hardware, and the negotiation between Computer
Producer Agent and the Transporter Agent on task Deliver Computer.
How can the agent deal with these interrelated negotiations? One approach is to deal with these negotiations independently
ignoring their interactions1. If these negotiations are performed concurrently, there could be possible conﬂicts among the solutions
to these negotiations; hence the agent may not be able to ﬁnd a combined feasible solution that satisﬁes all constraints without
re-negotiation over some already “settled” issues. For example, in Figure 1, suppose the Computer Producer Agent negotiates
with the Consumer Agent and promises to ﬁnish Purchase Computer by time 20, and concurrently the Computer Producer Agent
also negotiates with the Transporter Agent about task Deliver Computer and gets a contract that task Deliver Computer will be
ﬁnished at time 30, then the Computer Producer Agent will ﬁnd it is impossible for task Purchase Computer be ﬁnished by time
20 given that its subtask Deliver Computer will not be ﬁnished until time 30.
To reduce the likelihood that this type of conﬂict occurs, these negotiations could be performed sequentially; the agent deals
with only one negotiation at a time, and later negotiations are based on the results of earlier negotiations. This sequential pro-
cess, however, is not a panacea. First of all, the negotiation process takes much longer when all the negotiations need to be
negotiated sequentially, potentially using up valuable time (delaying when problem solving can begin) and reducing the potential
solution space. For example, in Figure 1, suppose the deadline for completion of task Deliver Computer is 20, the same as task
Purchase Computer. If the negotiation on task Deliver Computer starts at 10 and ﬁnishes at time 12, then the execution of task
Deliver Computer can only start after time 12. However, if the negotiation on task Deliver Computer starts at time 3, there is a
larger time slot for the execution of task Deliver Computer; hence, it is easier for the negotiation on task Deliver Computer to
succeed. Additionally, when the negotiation deadline is taken into consideration, a negotiation started later may lose any chance
of success. For instance, in Figure 1, suppose the Consumer Agent associates a negotiation deadline of 8 with the proposal of task
Purchase Computer, if the Computer Producer Agent replies to this proposal later than time 8 because it wants to settle its other
negotiations ﬁrst, it cannot get the contract on task Purchase Computer accepted.
Secondly, even if all the negotiations are sequenced, there is no guarantee of an optimal solution or even of any possible
1This approach seems too naive, but is commonly used. Most research only deals with single negotiation; little work has been done to study
the relationships among different negotiations with complex task structures (Section 7 provides more discussion of related work).
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Figure 2: Negotiations linked by a “facilitates” relationship
solution. This problem can occur if the agent does not reason about the ordering of the negotiations and just treats them as
independent negotiations, with their ordering being random. In this situation, the results from the previous negotiations may make
later negotiations very difﬁcult or even impossible to succeed. For instance, in Figure 1, if the Computer Producer Agent ﬁrst
negotiates about task Purchase Computer before starting the negotiations on task Get Hardware and task Deliver Computer, and
the promised ﬁnish time of task Purchase Computer results in tight constraints on the negotiations on task Get Hardware and task
Deliver Computer, these negotiations may fail and the commitment on task Purchase Computer would have to be decommitted
from.
One additional problem is caused by the difﬁculty in evaluating a commitment given that the result of later negotiations are
unknown, and thus making it harder for an agent to ﬁnd a local solution that will contribute effectively to the construction of a
good global solution. For example, in Figure 2, agent A has two non-local tasks (the tasks that are performed by other agents),
task Ta12 contracted to agent B and task Ta21 contracted to agent C. There is a “facilitates” relationship from Ta12 to Ta21. If
Ta12 could be ﬁnished before Ta21 starts, it would reduce the processing time of Ta21 by 50%. Suppose agent A ﬁrst negotiates
with agent C and then negotiates with agent B; as a result of the negotiation with agent C, it is decided that Ta21 starts at time
20 and ﬁnishes by time 40, but then it is found through the negotiation with agent B that task Ta12 could only be ﬁnished by time
25. Given this later information, if the start of Ta21 is delayed to time 25, Ta21 actually could be ﬁnished at time 35 because of
the facilitates effect. This solution would not be found, however, if the agent ignores the interactions among these negotiations.
These previous examples indicate how important it is for an agent to reason about the interactions among different negotiations
and manage them from a more global perspective. If done effectively, this permits the agent to minimize the possibility of conﬂicts
among the different negotiations and thus achieve better performance. Additionally, these examples show that it is difﬁcult to deal
with multi-linked negotiation problems because:
1. There are possible conﬂicts among related negotiations. If not resolved, these conﬂicts may cause the failure of the agent’s local
plan or reduce the agent’s local utility achievement.
2. There are uncertainties associated with negotiations. Since the agent does not have perfect and complete knowledge of the
other agents’ states, the result of a negotiation is uncertain. The agent may have an estimation about the likely outcome of the
negotiation, but it needs to be prepared for different outcomes.
3. There is a cost for negotiation. On one hand, the agent needs to allocate valuable computational and communication resources
for negotiation. On the other hand, the time spent on negotiation may affect the outcome of the negotiation. For example,
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the longer time spent on negotiation may reduce the time available for execution hence reducing the possibility of ﬁnding a
solution. Similarly, a delayed reply to a proposal may not be accepted if there are other agents who have already replied to it
earlier.
4. The negotiation process needs to be interleaved with the agent’s local planning and scheduling process because the agent needs
to ﬁnd a feasible local solution that satisﬁes all commitments and local constraints.
The multi-linked negotiation problem is not only a complicated problem, but also an important one because it actually happens
in a number of application domains. For example, in a supply chain problem, negotiations go on among more than two agents.
The consumer agent negotiates with the producer agent, and the producer agent needs to negotiate with the supplier agents. The
negotiations between the producer agent and the supplier agents has a direct inﬂuence on the negotiation between the producer
agent and the consumer agent. Figure 3 shows a supply chain example, where there are a number of companies, some of which
produce parts for computers and some of which assemble computers, where others are distributors, stores and customers. Multi-
linked problems occur throughout this system. We will also present a detailed supply chain scenario with multi-linked negotiations
based on Figure 3 in Section 2, and use this scenario as an example throughout this paper. Another example of multi-linked
negotiation is a distributed sensor network [5]. There are multiple sensors distributed at different locations, each of which has
different coverage. Multiple targets move through the region and it takes a certain number (more than one) of sensors to track a
target so as to get sufﬁcient sensor data for acceptable tracking quality. Which sensors should be used to track which target during
which time interval poses an interesting multi-linked negotiation problem.
In general, a Multi-linked negotiation problem occurs when an agent needs to negotiate with multiple other agents about
4different subjects, and the negotiation over one subject has inﬂuence on the negotiations over other subjects. The commitment of
resources for one subject affects the evaluation of a commitment or the construction of a proposal for another subject. To solve
a multi-linked negotiation problem, an agent needs to ﬁnd an efﬁcient approach, which includes a temporal ordering of these
negotiations and appropriate parameters for each feature in negotiations, so as to minimize the conﬂicts and maximize the agent’s
expected utility. In this paper, we ﬁrst explicitly address this multi-linked negotiation problem and analyze it, then we develop a
formalized model and a set of reasoning tools that enable an agent to ﬁnd an near-optimal solution for this problem.
In the remaining of this paper, we will ﬁrst introduce a detailed multi-linked negotiation scenario and basic assumptions in
this work (Section 2). Next we will present a formalized model for the problem is presented in Section 3. Using this model,
the agent can ﬁnd the best ordering of the negotiations and their parameters, and hence increase its local utility achievement. A
partial order schedule and a set of related algorithms will be presented in Section 4, which are necessary for the agent to reason
about the time constraints and the ﬂexibility of each negotiation. The partial order schedule and the related reasoning tools also
make parallel negotiations feasible by eliminating potential conﬂicts. An example to show how this model works is presented in
Section 5. Three sets of experimental work are presented in Section 6. Section 6.1 examines the performance of the the heuristic
algorithm, Section 6.2 shows that this management technique for multi-linked negotiation leads to improved performance, and
Section 6.3 shows it is important for agents to reason about ﬂexibility in a multi-linked negotiation problem. Section 7 discusses
related work, with special attention on the relationship between the approach presented in this paper and another approach based
on a combinatorial auction. Section 8 summarizes this paper.
2 Supply Chain Example
In this section, we describe the supply chain example presented in Section 1 in greater detail. This example will be used throughout
the rest of this paper to explain the multi-linked negotiation problem. However, the negotiation process and the following approach
are domain-independent and are not restricted to this application.
2.1 Supply Chain Scenario
There are four agents in Figure 1:
1. Consumer Agent generates three types of new tasks: Purchase Computer task for Computer Producer Agent, Purchase Parts
task for Hardware Producer Agent, and Deliver Product task for Transporter Agent.
2. Computer Producer Agent receives the Purchase Computer task from Consumer Agent, and needs to decide if it should accept
this task and, if it does, what the promised ﬁnish time of the task should be. Figure 1 shows the local plan for producing
computers; it includes a non-local task Get Hardware that requires negotiation with Hardware Producer Agent. It also includes
a non-local task Deliver Computer that requires negotiation with Transporter Agent.
3. Hardware Producer Agent receives two types of tasks: Get Hardware from Computer Producer Agent and Purchase Parts from
Consumer Agent. It need to decide whether to accept a new task and what is its promised ﬁnish time.
4. Transporter Agent receives two types of tasks: Deliver Computer from Computer Producer Agent and Deliver Product from
Consumer Agent. It needs to decide whether to accept a new task and what is its promised ﬁnish time.
We ﬁrst deﬁne two generalized terms to make the following description easier. In the following description, we will use the term
contractor agent to refer to the agent who performs the task for another agent and gets rewarded for the successful completion of
5the task; and contractee agent to refer to the agent who has a task that needs to be performed by another agent and pays a reward
to the other agent. The contractor agent and the contractee agent negotiate about a task and a contract is signed (a commitment is
built and conﬁrmed) if an agreement is reached during the negotiation.
In this work, the negotiation process between agents is based on an extended contract net model [10, 13]:
1. Contractee agent announces a task by sending out a proposal.
2. Contractor agent receives this proposal, evaluates it, responds to it in one of three ways: by accepting it, by simply rejecting it,
or by rejecting it but at the same time making a counter-proposal.
3. Contractee agent evaluates the responses, it either chooses to conﬁrm an accepted proposal, or chooses to accept a counter-
proposal.
4. Contractee agentawardsthetasktothechosen contractor agent basedonthecommitment(themutuallyaccepted upon proposal
or counter-proposal) which is conﬁrmed by both agents; the negotiation process then ends successfully. If a mutually agreed
proposal/counter-proposal cannot be found, the negotiation process fails.
This process can be extended to a multi-step process by introducing an extended series of alternative proposals and counter-
proposals. However, in this paper, we only focus on the two-step (proposal, counter-proposal) negotiation process. The implica-
tions of performing a multi-step negotiation instead of a two-step negotiation can be found in [17].
A proposal which announces that a task (t) needs to be performed includes the following attributes:
1. earliest start time (est): the earliest start time of task t; task t cannot be started before time est.
2. deadline (dl): the latest ﬁnish time of the task; the task needs to be ﬁnished before the deadline dl.
3. minimum quality requirement (minq): the task needs to be ﬁnished with a quality achievement no less than minq2.
4. regular reward (r): if the task is ﬁnished as the contract requested, the contractor agent will get reward r.
5. early ﬁnish reward rate (e): if the contractor agent can ﬁnish the task by the time (ft) as it promised in the contract, it will get
the extra early ﬁnish reward: max(e ∗ r ∗ (dl − ft),r)3, in addition to the regular reward r.
6. decommitment penalty rate (p): if the contractor agent cannot perform the task as it promised in the contract (i.e. the task
could not ﬁnish by the promised ﬁnish time), it pays a decommitment penalty (p ∗ r)4 to the contractee agent. Similarly, if the
contractee agent needs to cancel the contract after it has been conﬁrmed, it also needs to pay a decommitment penalty (p ∗ r) to
the contractor agent.
When the potential contractor agent receives a task proposal, it evaluates it and decides to either accept it or reject it. If it accepts
this proposal, it needs to decide what the promised ﬁnish time should be. If it rejects the proposal, it can either simply say “no”
2In this framework, we allow a task to be completed in different ways which may lead to different quality achievements, different durations
and different costs.
3It is assumed that for each time unit the task being ﬁnished earlier than the deadline, the contractor agent gets extra reward e ∗ r, but the
total extra reward would not exceed the reward r.
4Using this model, the penalty only depends on the decommitment rate and the regular reward in the contract. Actually a more complicated
model can be introduced where the time of decommitment is taken into consideration, i.e., a decommitment announced earlier has less penalty
than a decommitment in the last minute.
6or generate a counter-proposal which modiﬁes some of the attributes in the proposal to accommodate its local problem-solving
context.
In the above discussion, we assume the negotiation is about a task that needs to be performed; however, the negotiation can also
be about a nonlocal resource requirement necessary for the completion of a task. The agent can require a resource during a time
period and pay for this resource usage. In this situation, some of the attributes speciﬁed in the proposal are different from those
in the above description5, but the basic negotiation process is the same, and the methodologies we discuss in this paper are also
suitable for negotiation over resources.
2.2 Detailed example of a multi-linked negotiation problem
Suppose Computer Producer Agent has received the following two tasks in the same scheduling time window6:
task name : Purchase Computer A
arrival time: 5
earliest start time: 10 (arrival time + estimated negotiation time (5))7
deadline: 40
reward: r=10
decommitment penalty: p=0.5
early ﬁnish reward rate: e=0.01
task name : Purchase Computer B
arrival time: 7
earliest start time: 12 (arrival time + estimated negotiation time (5))
deadline: 50
reward: r=10
decommitment penalty rate: p=0.6
early ﬁnish reward rate: e=0.005
The agent’s local scheduler8 reasons about these two new tasks according to the above information: their earliest start times,
deadline, estimated process times and the rewards. It then generates the following agenda which includes the following tasks:
Agenda 2.1 [10,26] Purchase Computer A [26,46] Purchase Computer B
In this agenda, task Purchase Computer A is scheduled during time range [10, 26], and task Purchase Computer B is scheduled
during time range [26, 46]. This agenda is only a high level plan and does not include the detailed actions (methods) that need to
be executed. The Computer Producer Agent checks the local plans for these tasks9 as shown in Figure 4 and ﬁnds there are ﬁve
negotiations:
5For example, the minimum quality requirement is not applicable for a resource requirement. A quantity requirement may be necessary to
specify how much resource is needed.
6The agent will not schedule every time a new task arrives, but will schedule all tasks that fall into the same scheduling time window.
7The task cannot be started until the contract has been conﬁrmed.
8In this work, we use MQ scheduler as agent’s local scheduler, which is based on the MQ framework [14] that allows agents to reason about
different organizational objectives.
9There are different ways to perform a task, which are represented as different methods in the task structures. In Figure 4, Computer
Producer Agent chooses to deliver the computer through the transporter agent (Deliver Computer A) for task Purchase Computer A while ship
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Figure 4: Computer producer agent’s tasks
1. Negotiate with Consumer Agent about the promised ﬁnish time of Purchase Computer A10.
2. Negotiate with Consumer Agent about the promised ﬁnish time of Purchase Computer B.
3. Negotiate with Hardware Producer Agent about whether it can accept the task Get Hardware A and if it accepts this task, what
is the promised ﬁnish time.
4. Negotiate with Hardware Producer Agent about the task Get Hardware B, with the same concerns as above.
5. Negotiate with Transporter Agent about whether it can accept the task Deliver Computer A, and if it accepts this task, what is
the earliest start time and what is the promised ﬁnish time.
These ﬁve negotiations are all related. The potential relationships among multiple negotiation issues can be classiﬁed as two
types. One type of relationship is the directly-linked relationship: negotiations A and B are directly-linked if negotiation B affects
negotiation A directly because the subject in negotiation B is a necessary resource (or a subtask) of the subject in negotiation A.
The characteristics (such as cost, duration and quality) of subject B directly affect the characteristics of subject A. For example,
as pictured in Figure 1, the negotiation on the task Purchase Computer A is directly-linked to the negotiation on the two tasks:
Get Hardware A and Deliver Computer A. If either one of these two tasks fails, the task Purchase Computer A cannot be ac-
complished. Furthermore, when and how these two tasks are performed also affects the way that the task Purchase Computer A
is going to be accomplished. In the same way, the negotiations about Get Hardware B and Purchase Computer B are directly-
linked.
Anothertypeofrelationshipistheindirectly-linked relationship: negotiationAandBareindirectly-linkedifthesubjectsinthese
negotiations compete for use of a common resource. For example, as shown in Figure 4, besides the task Purchase Computer A,
Computer Producer Agent has another contract on task Purchase Computer B. Because of the limited capability of the Computer
Producer Agent, when task Purchase Computer A will be performed affects when task Purchase Computer B can be performed.
The negotiation about task Purchase Computer A and the negotiation about task Purchase Computer B are indirectly-linked.
the computer through a package mailing system (Shipping Computer A) for task Purchase Computer B. This decision is made by the agent’s
scheduler depending on the difference of the characteristics of these methods and the problem-solving context.
10There are other attributes in the proposal that also can be negotiated over, such as regular reward, earlier reward rate, and decommitment
penalty. We only mentioned promised ﬁnish time here as an example, because it is closely related to other negotiations.
8The essential difference between directly-linked and indirectly-linked relationships is the following. If negotiation A and B are
directly-related, then the failure of one negotiation may cause the subject (task or resource) in the other negotiation to be infeasible
or unnecessary. For example, if the subject B is a subtask of A, then the failure of negotiation on B will cause the task A to be
infeasible if there is no other task that could substitute for task B; likewise, the failure of negotiation A will make the subtask B
unnecessary. If negotiation A and B are indirectly-linked, then there is no such inﬂuence between them. In the formalized model
presented in Section 3, we will show that these two different relationships are represented differently.
2.3 Analysis of the Problem
In general, multi-linked negotiation (including both the directly-linked and the indirectly-linked relationships) describes situations
where one agent needs to negotiate with multiple agents about different issues, where the negotiation over one issue inﬂuences the
negotiations over other issues. The characteristics of the commitment on one issue affects the evaluation of a commitment or the
construction of a proposal for another issue. How can the agent deal with these interrelated negotiations? Two questions need to
be answered. The ﬁrst question is in what order should the negotiations be performed. Should all the negotiations be performed
concurrently or in sequence? If in sequence, in what sequence? The second question is how the agent assigns values for those
attributes (also referred as “features”) in negotiation, such as the earliest start time, deadline, so as to minimize the potential
conﬂicts among negotiations and maximize the utility of the agent as a result of multiple negotiations.
In a multi-linked negotiation problem, there are potentially many choices to order negotiations, such as doing some of them
in parallel and some of them in sequence. Why is the order of negotiation important? First, because each negotiation issue has
a negotiation deadline, set by the contractee agent, if the contractor agent cannot reply to a task proposal before the negotiation
deadline, the negotiation fails. One reason for missing the negotiation deadline is that the contractor agent is busy on other
negotiations before it decides to perform this negotiation. Furthermore, even if the negotiation is completed before its deadline,
when the negotiation is started affects the likelihood of a successful negotiation. For example, when there are several potential
contractor agents, the earlier a response to negotiation is received, the more likely the offer is accepted. Likewise, the earlier
the contractee agent initiates the negotiation, the more likely the contractor agent is to accept the proposal, since the earlier a
negotiation is started, the larger the space (time range) for the agent to ﬁnd a feasible solution. For instance, given that the
deadline for task Get Hardware A is 30, if the negotiation on this task ﬁnishes at time 10, there is a 20-time-unit range for
Hardware Producer Agent to ﬁnd a time in its local schedule to execute this task; if the negotiation ﬁnishes at time 20, Hardware
Producer Agent only has 10-time-unit range to ﬁnd a suitable time slot to execute this task. So the order of negotiation directly
affects the outcome of the negotiation.
Meanwhile, in a multi-linked negotiation problem, there are several features that the agent needs to negotiate over for each
subject. For a task proposal, the contractee agent needs to ﬁnd the earliest start time and deadline to request for the task, how
much reward to pay for this task, the early reward rate, and the decommitment penalty, etc. The contractor agent needs to decide
the promised ﬁnish time. Some of these features are related to the features of the subjects in other negotiations. For example, the
deadline proposed for task Get Hardware A affects the earliest start time of task Deliver Computer A, and the deadline of task
Deliver Computer A affects the promised ﬁnish time for task Purchase Computer A. The agent needs to ﬁnd appropriate values
for these features to avoid conﬂicts among them and to make sure there is a feasible local schedule to accommodate all the local
tasks and commitments. Furthermore, the values of these features inﬂuence the outcomes of the negotiation and the agent’s local
utility. For example, the greater the reward is, the greater the likelihood that the task will be accepted by the contractor agent;
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however, the contractee agent’s local utility decreases as the reward it pays to the contractor agent increases. Also, the later the
deadline for task Get Hardware A is, the more likely that this task will be accepted by the Hardware Producer Agent; however, the
consequence of a later deadline for task Get Hardware A is that there is less freedom for scheduling task Deliver Computer A, and
the promised ﬁnish time for task Purchase Computer A is pushed back later, hence reducing the early reward that the Computer
Producer Agent may get. A good negotiation strategy for a multi-linked negotiation problem should take an end-to-end perspective
that accounts for all negotiations, and provides the agent with an appropriate order of all negotiations and a feature assignment (a
set of assigned values) for those attributes under negotiation, so as to avoid the conﬂicts among negotiations and optimize utility.
3 Model of the Problem
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce a formalized model of the multi-linked negotiation problem and then present a heuristic search
algorithm to ﬁnd a near-optimal negotiation approach: a feature assignment and an order for a group of negotiations that an agent
needs to conduct in order to optimize the expected utility.
3.1 Deﬁnition of the Problem
A multi-linked negotiation problem occurs when an agent has multiple negotiations that are interrelated.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A multi-linked negotiation problem is deﬁned as an undirected graph (more speciﬁcally, a forest as a set of
rooted trees): M = (V,E), where V = {v} is a ﬁnite set of negotiations, and E = {(u,v)} is a set of binary relations on
V . (u,v) ∈ E denotes that negotiation u and negotiation v are directly-linked11. The relationships among the negotiations are
described by a forest, a set of rooted trees {Ti}. There is a relation operator associated with every non-leaf negotiation v (denoted
as ρ(v)), which describes the relationship between negotiation v and its children. This relation operator has two possible values:
AND and OR.
Figure 5 shows the model of the multi-linked negotiation problem (described in Figure 4) for Computer Producer Agent,
the problem includes ﬁve negotiations. This model can also handle negotiating with multiple agents on one subject. For ex-
11Isolated nodes can be either independent or indirectly-linked, depending on whether they compete for the same resource. Let’s take the
computational resource as an example: if the time window [est, dl] for the two negotiation subjects are overlapped, they are indirectly-linked;
otherwise, they are independent.
10ample, Figure 6 shows there are two transport agents: TAgent 1 and TAgent 2, both can be a potentially contractee for task
Deliver Computer A. The negotiation with TAgent 1 and the negotiation with TAgent 2 can be modeled as C1 and C2 under C
with a relation operator OR.
The subject in a negotiation v may be a task to be allocated or a resource to be acquired through negotiation.
From an agent’s viewpoint, there are two types of negotiations:
1. Incoming negotiation: The negotiation about a task proposed by another agent, or a resource requested by another agent.
For example, negotiation A (Purchase Computer A) and D (Purchase Computer B) in Figure 4 are incoming negotiations for
Computer Producer Agent.
2. Outgoing negotiation: The negotiation about a task that needs to be sub-contracted to another agent, or a resource requested
for a local task. For example, issue B (Get Hardware A), C (Deliver Computer A) and E (Get Hardware B) in Figure 4 are
outgoing negotiations for Computer Producer Agent.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A negotiation v is successful if and only if a commitment has been established and conﬁrmed for the subject in
this negotiation by those agents which are involved in this negotiation.
Deﬁnition 3.3 A leaf node v is task-level successful if and only if v is successful; A non-leaf node v is task-level successful if
and only if the following conditions are fulﬁlled:
• v is successful;
• all its children are task-level successful if ρ(v) = AND; or at least one of its children is task-level successful, if ρ(v) = OR.
As in Figure 5, negotiation A is task-level successful if and only if negotiation A is successful, and negotiations B and C are
also successful. In this case, Computer Producer Agent can actually perform task Purchase Computer A successfully.
Each negotiation vi(vi ∈ V ) is associated with a set of attributes Ai = {aij}. Each attribute aij either has already been
determined or needs to be decided. There are two types of attributes: the attributes-in-negotiation (the features (attributes) of
the subject to be negotiated, such as task deadline, reward (price), quantity, etc.), and the attributes-of-negotiation itself (i.e.
negotiation start time, negotiation deadline, etc.). The attributes in negotiation are in general domain dependent. In this supply
chain example, the following attributes (this is a complete and formal presentation compared to those mentioned in Section 2.1)
need to be considered:
1. time range (st(vi),dl(vi)): the time range associated with a task contains the start time (st(vi)) and the deadline (dl(vi)). The
task can only be performed during this range (st(vi),dl(vi)) to produce a valid result.
2. duration (d(vi)): the process time requested to accomplish this task.
3. ﬂexibility (f(vi)): the ﬂexibility is deﬁned based on the time range and the duration: f(vi) =
dl(vi)−st(vi)−d(vi)
d(vi) . The ﬂexibility
is an important feature because it directly affects the success probability of the negotiation (See detail in Section 5).
4. ﬁnish time (ft(vi)): the promised ﬁnish time for the task.
5. regular reward (r(vi)): if the contractee agent can ﬁnish the task by the deadline dl(vi), it gets reward r(vi).
6. early reward rate (e(vi)): if the contractee agent can ﬁnish the task earlier than the deadline dl(vi), it gets extra reward e(vi) ∗
(dl(vi) − ft(vi)).
7. decommitmentpenalty(β(vi)): thepenaltypaidtotheotheragentwhichisinvolvedinnegotiationvi, whentheagentdecommits
after vi is successful.
118. task-level successful reward (γ(vi)): the agent’s utility increases by the amount of γ(vi) when vi is a root of a tree and is
task-level successful. It is calculated by subtracting the cost of vi, including the local cost and sub-contracting cost (the reward
paid to other agents), from the total reward of vi (regular reward plus early reward).
The attributes-of-negotiation itself describes the negotiation process, they are domain in-dependent:
1. negotiation duration (δ(vi)): the time needed for negotiation vi either to successfully complete or fail. It is assumed that
negotiation duration is part of the agent’s knowledge12.
2. negotiation start time (α(vi)): the start time of negotiation vi. α(vi) is an attribute that needs to be decided by the agent.
3. negotiation deadline (￿(vi)): negotiation vi needs to be ﬁnished before this deadline ￿(vi). The negotiation is no longer valid
after time ￿(vi), which is the same as a failure outcome of this negotiation. For example, if task vi is proposed for negotiation,
the contractee agent needs to reply before time ￿(vi). Otherwise, this task proposal is no longer valid and the contractee agent
would think the contractor agent is not interested in this task. Furthermore, even if the agent starts the negotiation before ￿(vi),
it is not necessarily true that all times before ￿(vi) are equally good. Usually, a negotiation that is started earlier has a better
chance to succeed for two reasons: the other party considers this issue before other later arriving issues, and this issue has a
larger time range for negotiation. This relationship is described by the function ζi that takes α(vi) as one of its parameters.
4. success probability (ps(vi)): the probability that vi is successful. It depends on a set of attributes, including both attributes-
in-negotiation (i.e. reward, ﬂexibility, etc.) and attributes-of-negotiation (i.e. negotiation start time, negotiation deadline,
etc.). How these attributes affect the success probability can be described as a function ζi (an example of this function is
introduced in Section 5), which maps the values of the attribute aij, j = 1,2,...,k, to ps(vi): ps(vi) = ζi(ai1,ai2,...,aik). aij
(j = 1,...,k) represent the attributes that affect the success probability of this negotiation. This function is domain dependent,
the agent can construct this function through the following approaches. One approach is that for the agents to communicate
meta-level information before negotiation, such as the slack time in the agent’s schedule, the number of other competitors, etc.
This information could be used by the agent to construct the function more accurately. Another approach is for an agent to
learn to construct and adjust the structure of this function based on its previous negotiation experience, provide that the similar
negotiation situations are encountered multiple times. Reinforcement learning is a suitable technique for this problem.
The attributes above are similar to those used in project management [7], however, the multi-linked negotiation problem cannot
be reduced to a project management problem or a scheduling problem. As Figure 7 shows, the multi-linked negotiation problem
includes two sets of interrelated objects, the set of negotiations (shown in the upper box) and the subjects in these negotiations
(shown in the lower box). The negotiations are interrelated and the subjects are interrelated, also the attributes of negotiations
and the attributes of the subjects are interrelated too. The links among those attributes show the interrelationships among these
attributes. For example, the negotiation start time and the negotiation deadline affect the success probability, the time range, the
regular reward, and the earlier reward rate also affect the success probability. To solve a multi-linked negotiation problem, an
agent needs to ﬁnd a negotiation solution that includes the ordering of these negotiations (negotiation ordering) and appropriate
values assigned to those attributes-in-negotiation (feature assignment). The goal is to ﬁnd a negotiation solution that optimizes
the agent’s expected utility in these negotiations. The success probabilities, the task level success rewards and the decommitment
penalties all contribute to the evaluation of a negotiation solution. The negotiation ordering determines the negotiation start
time and/or the negotiation deadline of each negotiation, this ordering process can be viewed as a scheduling process of these
12In this case, we used an expectation of the negotiation duration, which could be learned from experience.
12Get_Hardware_A
Get_Software_A
[10, 24]
[10, 24]
Install_Software_A
[24, 30]
Deliver_Computer_A
[30, 40]
Purchase_Computer_A finish at time 40
Get_Hardware_B
Get_Software_B
[12, 26] 
[12, 26]
Install_Software_B
[26, 44]
Shipping_Computer_B
[29, 50]
Purchase_Computer_B finish at time 50
Evaluation of 
a negotiation solution:
Attributes of each negotiations:
Attributes in negatiation of A and D:
Attributes in negotiation of B, C, and E:
and
A
B C
D
E
Negatiations: A, B, C D, and E
Subjects in negotiations
A, B, C, D, and E
promised finish time
task−level successful reward
time range
regular reward
earlier reward rate
decommitment penalty
negotiation ordering
feature assignment
negotiation start time
negotiation deadline
success probability
C
D
A
E
B
Figure 7: The Structure of Multi-Linked Negotiation Problem
negotiations. Part of the feature assignment process is to ﬁnd consistent time ranges for those subjects in negotiations, which is
another scheduling-like process. However, the whole multi-linked problem is not a classic scheduling problem given these two
sets of interrelated objects. These extra dimensional complexities and interrelationships distinguish it from the classic project
management/scheduling problem, where there is only one set of interrelated objects that need to be arranged in order.
3.2 Description of the Solution
Given this multi-linked negotiation problem M = (V,E), an agent needs to make a decision about how the negotiations should
be performed. The decision concerns the negotiation ordering and the feature assignment, and they are interrelated. The values
assigned to some attributes, such as reward and ﬂexibility, will affect the probability of the success of the negotiation, and hence
will affect the ordering of the negotiations.
Deﬁnition 3.4 A negotiation ordering φ is a directed acyclic graph (DAG), φ = (V,Eφ). If e : (vi,vj) ∈ Eφ, then negotiation
vj can only start after negotiation vi has been completed. e : (vi,vj) is referred as a partial order relationship (POR), e. A
negotiation ordering can be represented as a set of PORs, {e}.
Deﬁnition 3.5 A negotiation schedule NS(φ) contains a set of negotiations {vi}. Each negotiation vi has its negotiation start
time α(vi)φ and its negotiation ﬁnish time ε(vi)φ that is calculated based on its negotiation duration δ(vi) and its negotiation
start time α(vi)φ.
Usingthetopologicalsortingalgorithm, anegotiationscheduleNS(φ)canbegeneratedfromanegotiationorderingφassuming
all negotiations started at their earliest possible times13. Given this assumption and a start time τ14 for a set of negotiations, the
13It assumes the negotiation on an issue starts immediately after all the negotiations that precede this negotiation have been ﬁnished according
to the negotiation ordering.
14The start time speciﬁes the earliest start time for all negotiations. It is also possible to specify a separately earliest start time for each
negotiation.
13A C B
D E
A C B
D E
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Figure 8: Three possible negotiation orderings
negotiation schedule generated from a negotiation ordering is unique.
As shown in Figure 8, suppose the negotiation start time τ = 0, and the negotiation duration of each negotiation is the same
δ(vi) = 5, thenthefollowingnegotiationscheduleisgeneratedfornegotiationordering#3inFigure 8accordingtotheassumption
that every negotiation starts at its earliest possible time:
A[0,5]B[5,10]C[5,10]D[0,5]E[5,10]
A[0,5] means that negotiation A starts at time 0 and ﬁnishes at time 5.
Deﬁnition 3.6 Given a start time τ, a negotiation ordering φ is valid if for every negotiation issue vi, the ﬁnish time ε(vi)φ is no
later than the negotiation deadline ￿(vi).
Deﬁnition 3.7 A feature assignment ϕ is a mapping function that assigns a value µij to each attribute aij that needs to be decided
in the negotiation. A feature assignment ϕ is valid if the assigned values of those attributes are consistent with each other.
”Consistent” is interpreted differently for different features. For time-related features, ”consistent” means that given the assigned
values of those time constraints, there exists at least one feasible local schedule for all tasks. The partial order scheduler and a
related toolkit presented in section 4 are used to test if the assigned values of the time-related features are consistent. For monetary
features such as reward or price, ”consistent” means that the sum of the sub-contracting cost paid to other agents is less than the
total expected reward. Algorithm A.1 in the Appendix handles the consistent check for all types of features.
Deﬁnition 3.8 A negotiation solution (φ,ϕ) is a combination of a negotiation ordering φ and a valid feature assignment ϕ.
The evaluation of a negotiation solution is based on the expected task-level successful rewards and decommitment penalties
given all possible negotiation outcomes for each negotiation. A negotiation has two possible outcomes: success and failure.
Deﬁnition 3.9 A negotiation outcome χ for a set of negotiations {vj},(j = 1,...,n) is a set of numbers {oj}(j = 1,...,n),oj ∈
{0,1}. oj = 1 means vj is successful, oj = 0 means vj fails. There are a total of 2n different outcomes for n negotiations,
denoted as χ1,χ2,...χ2n.
Deﬁnition 3.10 The expected value of a negotiation solution (φ,ϕ), denoted as EV(φ,ϕ), is deﬁned as:
EV(φ,ϕ) =
P2
n
i=1 P(χi,ϕ) ∗ (R(χi,ϕ) + C(χi,φ,ϕ))
P(χi,ϕ) denotes the probability of the outcome χi given the feature assignment ϕ.
P(χi,ϕ) =
Qn
j=1 pij(ϕ)
pij(ϕ) =



ps(vj),(ps(vj) = ζj(ϕ)) if oj ∈ χi = 1
1 − ps(vj) if oj ∈ χi = 0
R(χi,ϕ) denotes the agent’s utility increase given the outcome χi and the feature assignment ϕ. R(χi,ϕ) =
P
j γϕ(vj), vj
is a root of a tree and vj is task-level successful according to the outcome χi. C(χi,φ,ϕ) denotes the decommitment penalty
(C(χi,φ,ϕ) <= 0) according to the outcome χi, the negotiation ordering φ and the feature assignment ϕ. C(χi,φ,ϕ) is the sum
of the decommitment penalties of those negotiations, which are successful, but their root nodes are not task-level successful, and
14such situations are unknown before these negotiation are started. C(χi,φ,ϕ) =
P
j βϕ(vj), vj represents every negotiation that
fulﬁlls all the following conditions:
1. vj is successful according to χi;
2. the root of the tree that vj belongs to isn’t task-level successful according to χi;
3. according to the negotiation ordering φ, there is no such negotiation vk existing that fulﬁlls all the following conditions:
(a) vk and vj belong to the same tree;
(b) vk gets a failure outcome according to the outcome χi;
(c) vk makes it impossible for root(vj) to be task-level successful;
(d) the negotiation ﬁnish time of vk is no later than the negotiation start time of vj according to the negotiation ordering φ.
3.3 Description of a Heuristic Search Algorithm
Based on the above deﬁnition, we present an algorithm that ﬁnd a nearly optimal (as we show in the experimental results)
negotiation solution for a multi-linked negotiation problem M = (V,E).
Given a multi-linked negotiation problem M = (V,E), the start time for negotiation τ, a set of valid feature assignments
ω = {ϕk}, k = 1,...,m, the complete search algorithm evaluates each pair of negotiation ordering and valid feature assignment
(φi,ϕk), and then return the best one15. The exponential complexity of this complete algorithm prevents it from being used for
real-time applications when the number of negotiations and the number of valid feature assignments are large; hence a heuristic
search algorithm has been developed.
The heuristic search for the near-optimal negotiation solution is broken into two parts. One is to ﬁnd a near-optimal negotiation
schedule; the other one is to ﬁnd a near-optimal feature assignment for a given negotiation schedule. The search for the optimal
negotiation schedule is based on a simulated annealing search. Given a negotiation ordering φ, randomly pick a POR e, if e ∈ Eφ,
remove it from Eφ; otherwise add it into Eφ
16. A new negotiation ordering φnew is now generated. If the negotiation schedule
NS(φnew) is better than NS(φ), move to φnew; otherwise, move to φnew with some probability less than 1. This probability
decreases exponentially with the “badness” of this move. Three heuristics have been added to this simulated annealing process:
1. Record the best negotiation schedule so far found. When the search process ends, return the best negotiation schedule ever
found rather than the current one.
2. Instead of randomly deciding whether to add a POR or remove a POR, use a parameter (add por probability) to control
the probability of the operation “add” or “remove”. Actually, this parameter controls the tradeoff between sequencing versus
parallelizing the negotiation schedule (adding a POR forces two negotiations to be serialized).
3. Instead of completely randomly choosing a POR to change from current negotiation ordering, evaluate every POR e according
to how the value of the negotiation schedule changes by adding this POR e to an empty POR set. The probability of adding
POR e to the current POR set or removing POR e from the current POR set depends on this evaluation. A POR e with a higher
15If the set of valid feature assignments is a complete set of all possible valid feature assignments, this algorithm is guaranteed to ﬁnd the best
negotiation solution. However, when the attributes have continuous value ranges, it is impossible to ﬁnd all possible valid feature assignments.
We use a depth- ﬁrst search (DFS) algorithm that searches over the entire value space for all undecided attributes by pre-deﬁned search step size
and ﬁnds a set of valid feature assignments (See Appendix, Algorithm A.1).
16The algorithm checks whether adding POR e to φ causes a circle. If so, e won’t be added, and the algorithm will randomly choose another
POR and continue.
15positive evaluation has a higher probability of being added, and has a lower probability of being removed.
Consider an example with three negotiations A, B and C. Suppose the negotiation start time τ = 0, and the negotiation duration
of each negotiation is the same δ(vi) = 5, the evaluation of POR (A → B) is calculated as: the value of the negotiation
schedule: A[0,5]B[5,10]C[0,5] minus the value of the negotiation schedule: A[0,5]B[0,5]C[0,5].
Thesearchforthenear-optimalfeatureassignmentisbasedonahillclimbingsearch. Randomlypickanotherfeatureassignment
ϕk. If it is better than current one, move to ϕk. After considering the characteristics of this problem, the following heuristics have
been added to this search process:
1. According to the generation process, the change of those valid feature assignments is continuous. Based on this observation, a
number of sample points with equal distance (the distance is adjustable, denoted as sample step) in between can be selected
from all the valid feature assignments and evaluated. Hill climbing search then can be performed for each sample point.
2. Given current chosen feature assignment, the possible operations include: moving to left and moving to right. If there is a better
selection than current one, move to the better selection; otherwise the search stops and a local maxima is found.
3. Compare all local maxima and return the best one.
Both search algorithms are implemented with search limitation threshold: after certain amount of search effort, the algorithm
will stop and report the result. Experiments were performed to test how well these combined heuristic algorithms work, and as we
will describe in 6.1, the experimental work shows that the heuristic search algorithm ﬁnds solutions very close to the best solutions
found by the complete search algorithm with signiﬁcantly less effort.
4 Partial Order Schedule and Related Algorithms
In this section, we will introduce a partial order scheduler which allows the agent to reason about the time-related constraints and
the ﬂexibility associated with each negotiation issue. This toolkit is used by the agent to ﬁnd valid feature assignments, which are
part of the input for the heuristic search algorithm described in Section 3.3.
4.1 Partial Order Schedule
A partial-order schedule is the basic reasoning tool that we use for interrelated negotiations. Here we present the formalization
of the partial-order schedule and use examples to explain how it works for a multi-linked negotiation. Figure 9 shows the partial-
ordered schedule generated for the example in Figure 4.
A partial order schedule17 represents a group of tasks with speciﬁed precedence relationships among them using a directed
acyclic graph: PS = (T,R). T = {t|tisatask}, where each vertex in T represents a task, and R = {(s,t)|s,t ∈ T)}, where
each edge (s,t) in R denotes the precedence relationship between task s and task t (P(s,t)), which means that task s has to be
ﬁnished before task t can be started.
A Task is represented as a node in the graph; it is the basic element of the schedule. A task t needs a certain amount of
processing time, also referred as its duration (t.process time). A task can be a local task or a non-local task; a local task is
performed locally (i.e, task Get Software A and task Shipping Computer B) and a non-local task (i.e. task Get Hardware A and
task Deliver Computer A) is performed by another agent; hence, it does not consume local process time. The pretasks of task t is
17In this paper, the term “partial order schedule” refers to a representation of a group tasks with speciﬁed precedence relationships, which also
includes the associated deﬁnitions in this section. The term “partial order scheduler” is used to refer to the procedure which actually produces
the partial order schedules for tasks, and a set of associated reasoning algorithms presented in Section 4.2.
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Figure 9: The partial order schedule of Computer Producer Agent
a set of tasks that need to be ﬁnished before t can start: Pre(t) = {s|s ∈T,(s,t) ∈ R}; t can start only after all tasks in Pre(t)
have been ﬁnished. For example, the pretasks of task Install Software A includes task Get Hardware A and task Get Software A.
The posttasks of task t is a set of tasks that only can start after t has been ﬁnished: Post(t) = {r|r ∈T,< t,r >∈ R}. For
example, the posttasks of task Install Software B includes task Shipping Computer B.
A task t has constraints of earliest start time (t.est) and deadline (t.dl). The earliest start time of a task t (t.est) is determined
by the earliest ﬁnish time of its pretasks (eft[Pre(t)]) and its outside earliest start time constraint (t.est o) 18:
t.est = max(eft[Pre(t)],t.est o)
The earliest ﬁnish time of a task t ( t.eft ) is deﬁned as:
t.eft = t.est + t.process time
The earliest ﬁnish time of a set of tasks T (eft[T]) is deﬁned as the earliest possible time to ﬁnish every task in the set T; it
depends on the earliest start time and the duration of each task. For example, in Figure 9, the outside earliest start time constraint
for task Install Software A is 10 (same as its super task Purchase Computer A), the earliest ﬁnish time for its pretasks is 17
(assume Get Hardware A could be ﬁnished at its earliest possible time), then the earliest start time for task Install Software A is
17.
The deadline of task t (t.dl) is determined by the latest start time of its posttasks (lst[Post(t)]) and its outside deadline
constraint (t.dl o):
t.dl = min(lst[Post(t)],t.dl o);
The latest start time of a task t (lst(t)) is deﬁned as:
t.lst = t.dl − t.process time;
The latest start time of a set of tasks T (lst[T]) is deﬁned as the latest time for the tasks in this set to start without any task missing
its deadline. It depends on the deadline and the duration of each task.
18Outside earliest start time for task t is the earliest possible start time decided by the problem-solving context. As a given parameter, it is not
changeable during the partial order reasoning process. For example, if the current time is 15, the task cannot start before time 15. In a similar
way, the outside deadline constraint is the task’s deadline decided by the problem solving context.
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Figure 10: The consistent ranges for tasks in negotiation: Get Hardware A, Get Hardware B, and Deliver Computer A
The ﬂexibility of task t represents the freedom to move the task around in this schedule.
F(t) =
t.dl−t.est−t.process time
t.process time .
For example, F(Get Software A) = 40−10−3
3 = 9.
A feasible linear schedule is a total ordered schedule of all tasks, that fulﬁlls the following conditions:
• Each task t takes n (n>=1, if t is interruptible; otherwise, n=1.) time periods (pti,i = 1,...n ) for execution,
P
i pti =
t.processtime.
• All precedence relationships are valid.
• All earliest start time and deadline constraints are valid.
A partial-order schedule is a valid if and only if there exists at least one feasible linear schedule that can be produced from this
partial order schedule without additional constraints and with the interruptible execution assumption19.
Without additional constraints and with the interruptible execution assumption, for a task t with the range [est, dl], no matter
when task t is executed during this range, if there exists at least one feasible linear schedule that can be produced from this partial
schedule, then the range [est, dl] for task t is a free range because task t can be executed during any period in this range.
Without additional constraints and with the interruptible execution assumption, for a set of tasks ti,(i = 1,2,...,n), with the
range [esti,dli],(i = 1,2,...n) respectively, no matter what time ti is executed during the range [esti,dli], if there exists at
least one feasible linear schedule that can be produced from this partial schedule, then the ranges [esti,dli],(i = 1,2,...n) for
tasks ti,(i = 1,2,...,n) are consistent ranges. Negotiation over tasks ti,(i = 1,2,...,n) can be performed in parallel using
these consistent ranges without worrying about conﬂicts. Figure 10 shows the consistent ranges for the tasks in the supply chain
example. This means, the negotiation for task Get Hardware A, Get Hardware B, and Deliver Computer A can be performed in
19Partial order schedule is a representation and reasoning tool of a group of tasks and their interrelationships. It is not an executable schedule
for the agent. To translate a partial-order schedule to an executable linear schedule, there are two different assumptions: the task is interruptible
or non- interruptible. The interruptible execution assumption is that the agent can switch to another task during the execution of one task, and
it can switch back at some point and continue the execution of the incomplete task. The non-interruptible execution assumption does not allow
execution of a task to be split into parts. In this work we adopt the interruptible execution assumption, however, we also do not consider there is
cost for interrupting and resumption of a task.
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Figure 11: The feasible linear schedule for those tasks in Figure 10
parallel using the time range [10, 24], [12, 26] and [30, 40]. Figure 11 presents a feasible linear schedule given these consistent
ranges. The two numbers in a box below a task represent the consistent range for this task, and the two numbers above a task
indicate the start time and the ﬁnish time for this task in one linear schedule. It should be noticed that for each task the start time
and the ﬁnish time fall into its consistent range, they also can be moved freely during this range.
The partial order schedule work is related to the Graphical Evaluation and Review Technique(GERT) [8] which is used for
project scheduling and management. The major difference between the GERT work and ours is that the GERT work is not
oriented to negotiation; all activities are local and can be managed with authority. Thus, with GERT there is no reasoning about
free range, consistent ranges and schedule ﬂexibility that we feel are critical for an agent to effectively manage multi-linked
negotiation. Without reasoning of these factors, it is difﬁcult to negotiate efﬁciently on multiple related issues.
4.2 Algorithms
We have built the following algorithms to support the negotiation based on the partial order schedule. We only describe the
functions of these algorithms, the detailed processes are presented in [16]. The complexities of these algorithms are provided
accordingly, n represents the number of input tasks.
Algorithm 4.1 Propagate EST DL (Complexity: O(n2))
Given a set of tasks with the outside constraints of the earliest start times and deadlines, durations and precedence relationships,
this procedure ﬁnds the earliest start time (t.est) and the deadline (t.dl) for each task t according to the deﬁnitions in Section 4.1.
Algorithm 4.2 Get Earliest Finish Time (Complexity: O(n2))
Given a set of tasks T, each task t has earliest start time (t.est) and its duration (t.process time), this procedure calculates the
earliest ﬁnish time of a set of tasks T (eft[T]).
Algorithm 4.3 Get Latest Start Time (Complexity: O(n2))
Given a set of tasks T, each task t has its deadline (t.dl) and its duration (t.process time), this procedure calculates the latest
start time of a set tasks T (lst[T]).
Algorithm 4.4 Feasible Schedule (Complexity: O(n4))
Given a partial order schedule (T, R), each task has its earliest start time and duration with respect to its pretask, posttask and its
outside constraints, this procedure generates a feasible linear schedule if the partial order schedule is valid; otherwise it reports
failure.
Theorem 4.1 If there exists a feasible linear schedule, the Feasible Schedule algorithm can ﬁnd one.
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Figure 12: Success probability depends on ﬂexibility
The proof of this theorem is presented in [16].
Besides Algorithm 4.4, we have also developed Algorithm 4.5 to answer the question of whether a partial order schedule is
valid without trying to ﬁnd a feasible linear schedule.
Algorithm 4.5 Range Evaluation (Complexity: O(n2))
This procedure determines if a partial order schedule is valid.
The basic idea of Algorithm 4.5 is to check every possible time range [est,dl] by constructing all possible combinations of
every task’s earliest start time and deadline. For all tasks falling into this range, if the sum of process times of these tasks is greater
than the time available (dl − est), there is no feasible linear schedule; otherwise, there exists a feasible linear schedule, because
every task t can ﬁnd a place between its earliest start time and its deadline.
This proves the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2 A partial order schedule is valid if and only if the procedure 4.5 returns true.
Using the above procedure, we have constructed the following algorithm to ﬁnd the free range of a non-local task used for the
negotiation.
Algorithm 4.6 Find NL Range (Complexity: O(n2))
Given a partial order schedule (T,R) containing a task nlt, this procedure ﬁnds the largest free range for task nlt.
If there is more than one non-local task, we need to sort them according to some characteristics (i.e. ﬂexibility, importance,
difﬁculty of negotiation, etc.), and work on them one by one. When the Find NL range procedure works on one task nlt i, the
range for those tasks before it (nlt 1, ..., nlt (i − 1)) has already been decided and cannot be changed. The range for those tasks
after it (nlt (i + 1), ...) are set to a range that is as small as possible, so as to allow this task nlt i to have the most freedom.
All of the above algorithms and procedures provide a toolkit for the agent to reason about its proposals and evaluate counter-
proposals from other agents.
5 Example
In this section, we demonstrate how the deﬁnition and the algorithm work on the supply chain examples in Figure 4.
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To make the output easier to understand, only negotiation A (Purchase Computer A), B (Get Hardware A) and C (De-
liver Computer A) are considered in the following example. For incoming negotiation A, regular reward r(A) = 19, the attribute
that needed to be decided is the promised ﬁnish time ft; the task-level successful reward depends on the promised ﬁnish time ft:
γ(v) = r(v) + e(v) ∗ (dl(v) − ft(v)).
For outgoing negotiation B and C, the attributes needed to be decided are the start time (st) and the deadline (dl). It is assumed
that the negotiation durations are already known to the agent, δ(A) = 3, δ(B) = 4, δ(C) = 4. The negotiation start times
need to be decide by the agent as part of the problem of constructing a negotiation ordering. It is also assumed that the success
probability depends on the ﬂexibility f(v), which is calculated based on the time range (st(v),dl(v)) and the process time d(v)
(f(v) =
dl(v)−st(v)−d(v)
d(v) ):
ps(v) = pbs(v) ∗ (2/π) ∗ (arctan(f(v) + c))) 20
pbs is the basic success probability of this negotiation v when the ﬂexibility f(v) is very large. c is a constant parameter used to
adjust the relationship. In this example, the following functions are used to determine the success probabilities for B and C:
ps(B) = pbs(B) ∗ (2/π) ∗ (arctan(f(B) + 2.5));
ps(C) = pbs(C) ∗ (2/π) ∗ (arctan(f(C) + 5)).
pbs(B) = 0.95, pbs(C) = 0.99.
The different constant parameters for ps(B) (2.5) and ps(C) (5) specify that issue C has a higher success probability than issue
B given the same ﬂexibility, as shown in Figure 12. The following parameters are randomly generated: the success probability of
A, the negotiation deadline, the early reward rate of A, and the decommitment penalty.
For every attribute that needs to be decided: start time (st), deadline (dl) and the promised ﬁnish time (ft), the agent can ﬁnd its
maximum possible range using the partial order schedule as shown in Figure 13. The agent searches over the entire possible value
space (Appendix, Algorithm A.1), and use the partial order schedule to test if a feature assignment is valid. A set of valid feature
assignments is found and used to ﬁnd the optimal negotiation solution combining ordering constraints and feature assignment.
20This function describes a phenomenon where initially the likelihood of a successful negotiation increases signiﬁcantly as the ﬂexibility
grows, and then levels off afterwards. This function mirrors our experience from the experiments in Section 6.3, which shows that after a certain
point, additional ﬂexibility does not signiﬁcantly improve the success probability. Obviously this function could be affected by the meta-level
information from the other agent.
21Table 1 shows the output of the complete search algorithm (See Appendix, Algorithm A.3) on six different cases in Figure 5,
based on different negotiation deadlines, early reward rates and decommitment penalties. In both case 1 and case 2, the negotiation
deadline ￿ = 6 is used, which results in a negotiation ordering that has the three negotiations performed in parallel. In case 2, A
has a higher earlier reward rate e(A), and all negotiations have lower decommitment penalties β than in case 1, so the negotiation
solution in case 2 arranges task A to ﬁnish 21 time units earlier than the requested deadline, and earns an extra reward of 4.0. In
exchange, B and C have smaller ﬂexibilities f(B) and f(C), hence lower success probability ps(B) and ps(C). In case 3 and
case 4, the negotiation deadline ￿ = 9. In case 3, A has a much lower success probability ps(A) than in case 4, so negotiation A
is scheduled before negotiation B and C. In case 5 and case 6, the negotiation deadline ￿ = 11 and negotiation A, B and C are
sequenced according to the success probabilities; the negotiation with the lower success probability starts earlier. In case 6, A
has a higher earlier reward rate e(A), and all negotiations have lower decommitment penalties β than case 5, so the negotiation
solution in case 6 arranges task A to ﬁnish 9 time units earlier than the requested deadline; this earns an extra of reward 1.3. In
exchange, B and C have smaller ﬂexibilities f(B) and f(C) and hence lower success probabilities ps(B) and ps(C). It is also
important to notice that in all cases, B gets larger ﬂexibility than C, but has a similar success probability to that of C. This occurs
because it is much easier for C to achieve a successful negotiation according to the function that deﬁnes the relationship between
the success probability and the ﬂexibility. This result demonstrates that this type of reasoning is possible given the formal model
described in Section 3.
6 Experimental Work
We have implemented all the algorithms and reasoning tools described in previous sections. To evaluate how these mechanisms
work, we have built those agents that described in the supply chain scenario (Section 5). These agents are implemented using JAF
(Java Agent Framework) [4], which provides the basic functions such as communication and execution, for the agent, so we can
focus on building the negotiation component. The experiments are performed in the multi-agent system simulator (MASS) [4],
which provides a concrete, re-runnable, well-deﬁned environment to test multi-agent negotiation. We designed and performed
three sets of experiments for different purposes as described below.
6.1 Performance of Heuristic Algorithm
The ﬁrst purpose is to test how well the heuristic algorithm works compared to the complete search algorithm. The experimental
setting is based on the example described in Section 5. New tasks were randomly generated with decommitment penalty β ∈
[0,25], early ﬁnish reward rate e ∈ [0,0.2], and deadline dl ∈ [60,70], and arrived at the contractee agents periodically. We use
the same task structures as described in Figure 4, tasks vary with randomly generated parameters. This scenario represents a class
of problems where one agent needs to deal with both directly-related and indirectly-related negotiation problems. The deadlines
of tasks are randomly generated from a range, which allows the agent to choose different negotiation orderings. The following
values (See algorithm A.4 for more details) were used in these experiments: add por probability = 0.55, TEMP MAX = 5;
TEMP STEP = 0.1; sample step = 10, search limit = 106.
Table 2 shows the performance of this heuristic search algorithm compared to the complete search algorithm. The quality of the
negotiation solution found is very close to the best solution found by the complete search. This heuristic algorithm saves a large
amount of search effort compared to the complete search when the number of negotiations and the number of possible feature
assignments increase. The heuristic search spends more effort than the complete search when the search space is very small (with
22Table 1: Examples of optimal negotiation solutions
￿ v e(A) β et er f(v) ps(v)
negotiation early decommit Negotiation = dl − ft early reward ﬂexibility success
deadline reward rate penalty Schedule = e(A) ∗ (dl − ft) probability
#1 A 0.012 22.2 A[0-3] 0 0 0.9
￿ = 6 B 1.32 B[0-4] 3.0 0.84
C 1.32 C[0-4] 0.83 0.88
#2 A 0.189 1.95 A[0-3] 21 4.0 0.92
￿ = 6 B 0.12 B[0-4] 1.0 0.78
C 0.12 C[0-4] 0.5 0.88
#3 A 0.117 16.6 A[0-3] 0 0 0.19
￿ = 9 B 0.991 B[3-7] 3.0 0.84
C 0.99 C[3-7] 0.67 0.88
#4 A 0.006 16.6 A[4-7] 0 0 0.64
￿ = 9 B 0.99 B[0-4] 2.43 0.83
C 0.99 C[0-4] 0.67 0.89
#5 A 0.043 17.7 A[0-3] 0 0 0.15
￿ = 11 B 1.06 B[3-7] 2.43 0.83
C 1.06 C[7-11] 0.83 0.88
#6 A 0.142 12.6 A[8-11] 9 1.3 0.84
￿ = 11 B 0.75 B[0-4] 1.43 0.80
C 0.75 C[4-8] 1.0 0.89
23Table 2: Performance of heuristic search algorithm (NN: number of negotiations; NF: Number of valid feature assignments (the data points
are grouped according to NN and NF); Quality: the quality of the approach found by the heuristic search compared to the best approach found
by the complete search (with quality normalized to 1.0); CS: the number of search steps of the complete search. HS: the number of search steps
of the heuristic search; Ratio: the ratio of heuristic search steps to complete search steps. DS: Number of data samples)
NN NF Quality CS HS Ratio DS
3 [0, 50) 0.982 336 520 1.547 89
[50, 100) 1.000 832 590 0.709 3
5 [0, 50) 1.000 1759 1967 1.119 48
[50, 100) 0.998 3861 1766 0.457 6
6 [0, 50) 1.000 9353 1869 0.200 43
[50, 100) 0.998 19502 1734 0.089 111
[100, 150) 0.998 31086 1674 0.054 123
[150, 200) 0.996 44058 1674 0.038 108
[200, 250) 0.995 57253 1692 0.030 88
[250, 300) 0.994 70292 1670 0.024 57
[300, 350) 0.997 82736 1638 0.020 46
[350, 400) 0.995 95213 1644 0.017 28
[400, 450) 0.994 108185 1662 0.015 25
[450, 500) 0.998 121479 1667 0.014 17
a few negotiations and a few of feature assignments). This problem can be ﬁxed by choosing the values of the search parameters
dynamically according to the size of current search space, instead of using the ﬁxed values as we did in these experiments. For
example, when the number of negotiations (NN) and the number of valid feature assignments (NF) is small, we can set the
search limit as a small number so that the search can stop earlier; because a good-enough solution can be found with less search
effort in a small search space.
6.2 Different Negotiation Strategies
The second purpose is to test how different negotiation strategies affect the agent’s performance under multi-linked negotiation
situation. We compare the negotiation strategy generated from the reasoning based on the formalized model with some other sim-
pler strategies. Under this experimental setup, Computer Producer Agent needs to deal with multi- linked negotiations related to
the incoming task Purchase Computer and the outgoing task Get Hardware and Deliver Computer. The following three different
negotiation strategies were tested:
1. Sequenced Negotiation. The agent deals with the negotiations one by one, ﬁrst the outgoing negotiations, then the incoming
negotiations. The ﬁnish time promised is the same as the deadline requested from the other agent, and the outgoing negotiations
get the largest possible ﬂexibilities.
2. Parallel Negotiation. The agent deals with the negotiations in parallel. It arranges reasonable ﬂexibility (1.5, in this experiment)
for each outgoing task, and based on this arrangement, the ﬁnish time of the incoming task is decided and promised to the
contractee agent.
3. Decision-Based Negotiation. The agent deals with the negotiation as the best negotiation solution generated by the complete
search algorithm.
24Table 3: Comparison of computer producer agent’s performance using different negotiation strategies
Policy Task Decommit Early Utility
Canceled Penalty Reward
Sequenced 37.25 73.82 0 358.09
Std.Dev. 2.6 11.8 0 57.4
Parallel 23.70 333.20 29.06 385.20
Std.Dev. 2.6 47.6 17.0 86.8
Decision-Based 25.78 56.65 185.79 779.16
Std.Dev. 2.4 23.5 47.8 62.3
The entire experiment contains 40 group experiments. Each group experiment has the system running for 1000 time clicks
for three times and each time Computer Producer Agent uses one of the three different approaches. During 1000 time clicks,
there are 60 new tasks received by Computer Producer Agent. Table 3 shows the comparison of Computer Producer Agent’s
performance using different strategies. When the agent uses the sequenced negotiation strategy, more tasks are canceled because
of the missed negotiation deadlines. When the agent uses the parallel negotiation strategy, the agent pays a higher decommitment
penalty because the failure of the sub-contracted task prevents the incoming task to be task-level successful. The decision-
based approach is obviously better than the other two approaches21. It chooses a negotiation strategy dynamically according to
negotiation deadlines and other attributes. Under this experimental setup, it chooses the case where all negotiations are performed
in parallel about 13% of the time; it chooses the case where all negotiations are performed sequentially about 38% of the time, and
the other times it chooses the case where some negotiations are performed in parallel. This strategy enables the agent to receive
more early reward and pay fewer decommitment penalties.
The experimental result shows that in a multi-linked negotiation situation, it is very important for the agent to reason about the
relationship among different negotiations and make a reasonable decision about how to perform negotiation. This decreases the
likelihood of the need for decommitment from previously settled negotiations and increases the likelihood of utility gain.
6.3 Experiments on Flexibilities
The third purpose is to study how the different ﬂexibility policies in negotiation, which involve different types of reasoning
strategies, affect the agent’s performance. The experimental environment is set up based on the scenario described in Figure
14. It is a simpliﬁed scenario from the example shown in Section 2. This scenario represents a class of problem where one
agent needs to deal with both directly and indirectly related negotiation problems. New tasks were randomly generated with
decommitment penalty rate p ∈ [0,1], early ﬁnish reward rate e ∈ [0,0.1], and deadline dl ∈ [45,105] (this range allows different
ﬂexibilities available for those sub-contracted tasks), and arrived at the contractor agents periodically. The local scheduler of the
agent schedules all incoming new tasks occurring in a scheduling time window according to their earliest start times, deadlines,
process times and rewards and generates an agenda (such as agenda 2.1 on page 7). From this agenda, the agent can ﬁnd the
21Using a t-test, with the 0.001 alpha-level, the following hypothesis Ho is rejected: when using the decision-based approach, Computer
Producer Agent achieves an extra utility that is equal to 100% of the utility gained when using the sequenced negotiation strategy, and 78% of
the utility gained when using parallel negotiation strategy, compared to the hypothesis Ha: when using the decision-based approach, Computer
Producer Agent achieves an extra utility that is more than 100% of the utility gained when using the sequenced negotiation strategy, and 78% of
the utility gained when using parallel negotiation strategy.
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scheduled ﬁnish time of each task. It could continue the negotiation about these incoming tasks just based on the information
from this agenda without further reasoning about the detailed plan for each task (actually, that is what the agent does when using
the “Earliest-Finish-Time Policy” and the “Deadline Policy”). At the same time, if the local plan of these accepted tasks involves
any non-local task nlt, then the Find NL Range procedure (Algorithm 4.6) is used to ﬁnd the earliest start time and the deadline
of the task nlt. The agent would then start negotiation with the other agent about task nlt based on this time range. The entire
experiment contains 32 group experiments. Every group experiment runs 3 times for 1000 time clicks each, each time using one
of the three different polices (All agents use the same policy at the same time).
In this experiment, Computer Producer Agent needs to deal with the multi- linked negotiations related to the incoming task
Purchase Computer and the outgoing task Get Hardware. The following three different negotiation policies were tested:
1. Earliest Finish Time Policy: the agent ﬁnds the scheduled ﬁnish time of the task from its agenda and promises it as the ﬁnish
time in the contract with the intention of maximizing the early ﬁnish reward. In the example of Section 2.2, Computer Producer
Agent will accept both task Purchase Computer A and task Purchase Computer B, with the promised ﬁnish time 26 and 46
respectively, according to agenda 2.1 on page 7.
2. Deadline Policy: The agent promises the ﬁnish time that is the same as the deadline of the task with no consideration of the
early ﬁnish reward. In the example of Section 2.2, Computer Producer Agent will accept both task Purchase Computer A and
task Purchase Computer B, with the promised ﬁnish time 40 and 50 respectively, according to their deadline requests.
3. Flexibility Policy: the agent analyzes its detailed partial-order schedule. If non-local tasks are found, it arranges for reasonable
ﬂexibility (1, in this experiment) for each non-local task, and based on this arrangement, the ﬁnish time of the incoming task is
decided and promised to the contractee agent. In the example of Section 2.2, Computer Producer Agent will accept both task
26Table 4: Comparison of performance using different negotiation policies in multi- linked negotiation.
CPA: Computer Producer Agent; HPA: Hardware Producer Agent
Policy Tasks Tasks Tasks Early Decommit Early Utility
Received Accepted Canceled Finished Penalty Reward
CPA Earliest Finish Time Policy 60 59 27 33 123 283 391
CPA Deadline Policy 60 60 0.5 0 2.9 0 413
CPA Flexibility Policy 60 60 1.7 53 8.3 297 697
HPA Earliest Finish Time Policy 87 87 27 29 0 36 268
HPA Deadline Policy 84 84 9.6 0 0 0 256
HPA Flexibility Policy 87 87 11 17 0 32 294
Purchase Computer A and task Purchase Computer B. The promised ﬁnish time for task Purchase Computer A is 39, and the
promised ﬁnish time for task Purchase Computer B is 40, according to the feasible schedule shown in Figure 15.
In all three cases above, the multiple negotiations are performed concurrently based on the free ranges found by the partial-order
scheduler. However, with the ﬁrst two policies, the agent does not reason about the interaction among negotiations or manage the
ﬂexibilities for each negotiation.
Table 4 shows the comparison of the agents’ performance using different policies. For the Computer Producer Agent (CPA),
who has multi- linked negotiations, the ﬂexibility policy is obviously better than the other two policies; it gives the agent higher
utility because it generates more early reward and it causes fewer decommitment penalties22. For the Hardware Producer Agent
(HPA), the Earliest Finish Time Policy and the Flexibility Policy make no difference in the agent’s decision making processes,
since the agent has no sub-contracted task that needs consideration. The reason that the Earliest Finish Time Policy generates
less utility for HPA is that because the Computer Producer Agent cancels more task requests (because the ﬁnish times that the
Hardware Producer Agent could provide are too late for CPA who also uses the Earliest Finish Time Policy at this time), and
hence the Hardware Producer Agent has fewer tasks to perform and gains less reward. Because the Computer Producer Agent
(CPA) is involved in the multi-linked negotiation, it pays lots of decommit penalties when it adopts the Earliest Finish Time Policy
when it ﬁnds that the ﬁnish time it promised can not be fulﬁlled. For the Hardware Producer Agent (HPA), who does not need
sub-contract task to other agents, the Earliest Finish Time Policy produces more utility than the Deadline Policy because it brings
some early reward without paying any decommit penalty. These experiments shows that in a multi-linked negotiation situation, it
is very important for the agent to reason about the relationships among different negotiations and maintain reasonable ﬂexibility
for them. This type of reasoning decreases the likelihood of decommitment from previously settled negotiations and thus gains
more utility.
22Using a t-test, with the 0.01 alpha-level, the following hypothesis Ho is rejected: when using the ﬂexibility policy, Computer Producer
Agent achieves an extra utility that is equal to 64% of the utility gained when using the Earliest Finish Time Policy, compared to the hypothesis
Ha: when using the ﬂexibility policy, Computer Producer Agent achieves an extra utility that is more than 64% of the utility gained when using
the Earliest Finish Time Policy .
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7 Related Work
To our knowledge, there is no other work that has addressed the directly- linked relationship in the negotiation process. There is
some work that takes into account the indirectly-linked relationship among multiple negotiations such as the distributed meeting
scheduling [12] problem and the distributed resource allocation problem [2]. However, those problems are different from our
problem in the following ways: the negotiation is cooperative by nature and the agent can altruistically withdraw its request
to help others succeed; the tasks are simple, no need for subcontracting; no time pressure on negotiation and no penalty for
decommitment. The negotiation problem presented in this paper is much more complicated. Additionally, in these works, the
agents do not explicitly reason about the relationships among different negotiations, in order to propose offers or counter-offers
(choose the appropriate parameters in the offer) to minimize the conﬂict and optimize the combined outcome. The ordering of
different negotiations is not taken into consideration in either of these approaches, which we feel is important for the agent to ﬁnd
a good negotiation approach. Sandholm [9] has developed a complex contract type - ”clustering- swap-multi-agent” that allows
tasks to be clustered, and then swapped between agents and even circulated among agents. This work deals with indirectly- linked
negotiations by introducing complicated contract types, however it does not reason about the interrelationship among tasks and
the inﬂuence of the temporal constraints on tasks as in our work.
A combinatorial auction could be another approach to multi-linked negotiation problem, in which there are multiple items for
sale, participants who may place bids on arbitrary subsets of those items, and an auctioneer who must determine which awardable
combination of bids maximizes revenue. It allows agents to select a shared plan for the group through a distributed computation
process [6]. It is also used to form a supply chain [15]. However, we don’t feel that combinatorial auction is a panacea for this
multi-linked negotiation problem or a better approach than the approach we described in this paper given the following reasons.
First of all, in combinatorial auction, the agent does not reason about the ordering of negotiations, since all items are announced
at the same time, meaning all issues are negotiated concurrently. However, this assumption does not ﬁt with the directly-linked
negotiation situation. For instance, inthisPCT example showninFigure16, theComputer Producer Agent receives ataskproposal
28Purchase Computer (A) from the Consumer Agent. To accomplish this task, the Computer Producer Agent needs to subcontract
task Get Hardware (B) and task Deliver Computer (C). If we put this example into the combinatorial auction framework, we
will ﬁnd that there is no way that these three negotiation issues A, B, and C can be performed concurrently without conﬂict.
Using the combinatorial auction model with time constraints [6], the Computer Producer Agent needs to ﬁrst announce the two
tasks Get Hardware and Deliver Computer, and wait for other agents to bid for these two tasks, and then select the combined
bids with consistent time constrains and minimized cost. Based on these selected bids, the Computer Producer Agent can go
back to negotiate with the Consumer Agent. Using this model, the ordering of negotiations A, B and C is always (B,C) → A.
This could be a solution, but by no means to be the best solution under all circumstances. As we have analyzed before and
also as the experimental results shown, the agent should dynamically choose the negotiation ordering based on the negotiation
deadlines, decommiment penalties, the estimations of successful probabilities, and other environmental context so as to maximize
the expected utility. However, the combinatorial auction model neither reasons about these attributes nor provides the agent with
the ﬂexibility to choose from different negotiation orderings. This limitation prevents the agent from ﬁnding a better negotiation
solution.
Secondly, the agent using a combinatorial auction model neither actively reasons about the interrelationships among these
related negotiation nortriestodirectthenegotiations toahopefully optimal solution, butjustwaitspassively andselectthe solution
fromwhateverisavailable, whichdoesnotguaranteeﬁndinga(good)solution. Let’scontinuewiththepreviousexample, usingthe
combinatorial auction model, the Computer Producer Agent simply announces the two tasks Get Hardware and Deliver Computer
and waits for the other agents’ bids. When the Hardware Producer Agent and the Transporter Agent construct their bids for these
two tasks respectively, they have no idea of how these two tasks relate to each other, all they can do is to construct the bids
based on their local problem solving context. Suppose based on the ”ﬁrst come, ﬁrst serve” rule, these two agents arrange these
new tasks after their current tasks. Assume that the bid from the Hardware Producer Agent is ”Get Hardware, cost $100, time
range: 10-17” based on its current task ﬁnishes at 10 and it takes 7 time units to perform task Get Hardware, and the bid from
the Transporter Agent is ”Deliver Computer, cost $5, time range: 15-21” based on its current task ﬁnishes at 15 and it takes 6
time units to perform task Deliver Computer. However, based on these two bids, the Computer Producer Agent cannot ﬁnd a
consistent solution because there is no time left for the task Install Software. Actually the solution does exist if the Transporter
Agent would leave some slack time before starting task Deliver Computer. The Transporter Agent does not have the necessary
information that leads to this decision. To solve this problem in combinatorial auction, it can be requested that the contractee agent
generate all possible bids and send them all to the contractor agent. However, this solution causes large amount of communication
(as shown in Figure 16, upper part), and large number of bids makes the winning-determination (WD) process more difﬁcult
and time-consuming23. This example shows that combinatorial auction is not a suitable model for multi-linked negotiation with
complicated task relationships. In comparison, in our approach (as shown in Figure 16, lower part), the Computer Producer Agent,
who has the most complete information, leads the negotiation by analyzing the relationships among negotiations and arranging
appropriate time ranges for related subjects in negotiation, which resulting in a more efﬁcient negotiation process and a better
solution in the end.
Thirdly, the general winning-determination problem for combinatorial auction is NP-complete [3]. Current WD algorithms[11,
23There has been some recent work on preference elicitation[1] that potentially could reduce the number of bids need to be sent. However, it
is our intuition that to make this preference elicitation process successful, it would need the similar type of reasoning process as shown in our
work.
293] are based on depth-ﬁrst search and using different types of heuristics. So, from the computational complexity perspective,
combinatorial auction and our approach are at the same level complexity.
The above analysis shows that combinatorial auction could be another approach to multi-linked negotiation, but it has limitation
that does not permit efﬁcient management of the negotiations where there are complex relationships. The approach in this paper
provides a more general model and solution to multi- linked negotiation problem.
8 Summary
In this paper, we deﬁned the multi-linked negotiation problem and demonstrate how an agent could deal with the multi-linked
negotiation problem. Multi-linked negotiation deals with multiple negotiations, where these negotiations are interconnected - the
negotiation over one issue affects other negotiations. To solve a multi-linked negotiation problem, the agent needs to ﬁnd out
in what order the negotiations should be performed, and how to negotiate on each issue to avoid conﬂict among them. First,
we construct a partial order schedule, which allows the agent to reason about time-related constraints and ﬂexibility on each
issue. This reasoning process is important for the agent to perform conﬂict-free negotiation and manage ﬂexibility in negotiation.
Furthermore, we presented a formalized model of the multi-linked negotiation problem that enables the agent to represent and
reason about the relationships among different negotiations explicitly. Using this model, a heuristic search algorithm is developed
to that ﬁnds the nearly optimal approach in reasonable time. Experimental work shows that this management technique for
multi-linked negotiation leads to improved performance over other simpler approaches.
In this work, we model the success probability as a function that depends on a set of features, but we have not worked out how
the agent can construct such a function. In the future, we’d like to use meta-level information and learning technologies for an
agent to construct and adjust the structure of this function. Also, the model and the algorithm presented here are for individual
agents, to extend this model to a multi-agent system is another direction of our future work. Additionally, in this work, the result
of the negotiation is limited to two outcomes: “success” or “fail”. Actually, when negotiation is successful, there are potentially
many different outcomes depending on the parameters in the commitment. such as different promising ﬁnish times. Depending
upon the different outcomes, the agent can adjust its other negotiations that are related to this negotiation. The negotiation process
can be modeled as a Markov decision process, and the negotiation solution can be generated as a policy: perform the negotiation
according to the results of the previous negotiations. This is another direction of our future work.
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A Appendix
Algorithm A.1 Find a set of valid feature assignments.
Input: M = (V,E).
For each attribute aij, if aij is already decided, the value of aij is decided value(aij);
if aij is undecided, the maximum possible range for aij is: [min value(aij),max value(aij)],
the search step size: stepij.
Output: a set of valid feature assignments ω.
Generate the possible value set Ψij for attribute aij;
If aij is already decided, Ψij = {decided value(aij)};
Else x = min value(aij);
Repeat
add x to Ψij;
x = x + stepij;
Until x > max value(aij)
Generate all possible feature assignments ϕk based on the possible values in Ψij;
If valid(ϕk), add ϕk into ω;
Return ω;
Algorithm A.2 Evaluate a negotiation schedule with all possible feature assignments and ﬁnd the best feature assignments and the best value.
Input: negotiation schedule φ, a set of valid feature assignments ω = {ϕk}, k = 1,...,m.
Output: the best value with the best feature assignment.
31begin
for(i=0; i<=m; i+=sample step)
add ϕi to search set;
for each ϕi in search set
for(t=0; t<search limit; t++)
if(EV(φ,ϕi+1) > EV(φ,ϕi))
i=i+1;
else if(EV(φ,ϕi−1) > EV(φ,ϕi))
i=i-1;
else
break;
if(EV(φ,ϕi) > best value)
best value = EV(φ,ϕi);
best assignment = i;
return(best value,best assignment);
end
Algorithm A.3 Complete search: Find the best negotiation strategy.
Input: M = (V,E), the start time for negotiation τ, a set of valid feature assignments ω = {ϕk}, k = 1,...,m.
The complete search algorithm evaluates each pair of negotiation ordering and valid feature assignment EV(φi,ϕk), then return the best one.
Output:the best negotiation strategy.
Generate all valid negotiation orderings {φi};
best value = minimum value;
best ordering = null;
best assignment = null;
for each negotiation ordering φi
for each valid feature assignment ϕk
if EV(φi,ϕk) > best value
best value = EV(φi,ϕk);
best ordering = φi;
best assignment = ϕk;
return (best ordering, best assignment)
Algorithm A.4 Heuristic search: Find the best negotiation strategy.
Input: M = (V,E), the start time for negotiation (τ), a set of valid feature assignments ω = {ϕk},k = 1,...,m, the probability to add a
por:add por probability. TEMP MAX, TEMP STEP: search parameters.
Output:the best negotiation strategy.
begin
Generate all possible PORs = {(vi,vj)|vi,vj ∈ V }
total value = 0;
total inverse value = 0;
base value = evaluate schedule(NS(V,∅), ω);
for each por ∈ PORs
φ(por) = (V,por)
por.value = evaluate schedule(NS(φ(por)), ω).value - base value;
32por.inverse value = 1.0 / por.value;
total value = total value + por.value;
total inverse value = total inverse value + por.inverse value;
for each por ∈ PORs
por.in probability = por.value/total value;
por.out probability = por.value/total inverse value;
for(t = TEMP MAX;t >= 0;t− = TEMP STEP)
generate a random number r between [0,1];
if( r < add por probability)
choose a por e from PORs/current ordering
according to in probability
new ordering = current ordering ∩e
else
choose a por e from current ordering according to
out probability
new ordering = current ordering - e
evaluation result = evaluate schedule(NS(φ(new ordering)), ω);
change value = evaluation result.value - current value;
if (change value > 0||random < e
−change value/t)
current value = evaluation result.value;
current assignment = evaluation result.assignment;
current ordering = new ordering;
if (change value > best value)
best value = current value ;
best assignment = current assignment;
best ordering =current ordering;
return (best ordering, best assignment);
end
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